Resolving Non-performing Assets of the Indian Banking System by He, Dong
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Resolving Non-performing Assets of the
Indian Banking System
Dong He
International Monetary Fund
September 2002
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9758/
MPRA Paper No. 9758, posted 29. July 2008 01:30 UTC
- 105 -
Vi. RESOLVI~G NO~-PERFORMIl'-G ASSETS OF THE INDIAN BANKLG SYSTEM-
THE ROLE OF ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANIESl
A. Introduction
1. Credit quality is low in the public sector banks (PSBs) and Development Finance
Institutions (DFIs), the dominant sub-sectors of the Indian banking system. The high
incidence ofnon-performing assets (NPAs) was the result of many factors, including poor
credit analysis skils and lending decisions, external shocks (e.g., unexpected slowdown in
economic activities), and shortcomings in the legal and judicial system that prevent the
timely exercise of creditor rights. Resolving the large stock. ofNPAs has been a pol icy
priority since the star of economic reforms in the early 1990s. However, progress has been
limited. Recently, the authorities have been actively pursuing the proposal of establishing an
asset reconstruction company (ARC) as a major instrment for facilitating the resolution of
NPAs?
2. International experience suggests that there are common factors that contribute
to the success of asset management companies (AMCs). These include supporting legal
and regulatory environment; strong leadership; operational independence; appropriately
structured incentives; and commercial orientation. There are, however, alternative strategies
for managing and disposing of impaired assets, depending on factors such as the tye of
asset, size and distribution, the structure ofthc banking system, and available management
capacity in the banks and in the public sector. There is no single optimal solution but rather a
combination of solutions for each country that may vary over time and for each bank.
3. This paper reviews the nature ofNPAs in the Indian banking system and
discusses the key design features that would be important for the ARCs to play an
effective role in resolving WAs. The analysis draws upon recent regional and cross-country
experiences in dealing with impaired assets during periods of financial crises. The main
conclusions are:
· An ARC in India has the potential to contribute to the resolution of the NPAs because
such a vehicle provides a mechanism of pooling together scarce skils in managing
and disposing of impaired assets. It could also help to resolve the coordination
problems of multiple creditors.
1 Prepared by Dong He (x34062), who is available to answer questions.
2 In the international Jiterature such companies arc typically referred to as Asset Management
Companies (AMes). In this paper, ARCs and AMes are used interchangeably.
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. However, the potential can only be realized if it is accompanied by changes in the
foreclosure laws to speed up the repossession of assets and by the removal of
legislation that tends to protect defaulting companies.
· It is critically important to ensure that the ARC has operatíonal independence, is
commercially oriented, and has profit maximization as its operational objective. Thus
transactions between the ARC and the major bans and financial institutions, which
are also likely to be its major shareholders, should be on an ars-lengt basis and
should not be used as an instrument to "window dress" the NPA problem.
. Moreover, since the market price ofNPAs is likely to be much lower than the
recorded book value (net of provisions) of such assets, the authorities would need to
be prepared to let the banks recognize the losses and reduce their recorded capital
levels. A recapitalization strategy would therefore have to be worked out.
4. The remainder ofthe paper is organized as follows: Section B describes the nature
of the NP A problem in the public sector banks and financial institutions. Section C
summarizes the efforts that have been taken by the authorities to resolve NP As. Section D
distìls lessons from international experiences in AMCs, and Section E discusses key issues
for an effective ARC in India.
B. The Nature of the NPA Problem
5. PSBs and DFIs have been plagued by a large stockofNPAs. NPAs before
provisioning were 12Y2 percent of gross credit at end-2000/01 in PSBs. This ratio was
brought down sharly from the peak of25 percent in 1994, mainly on account of a rapid
growth in the volume of credits (i.e., the denominator) rather than a decrease in the level of
NPAs. Net of provisions, NPAs stil account for a sizeable 6% percent of net credit
(Table Vi.l).3 Credit quality has been even lower in the major DFIs, notwithstanding that
3 Indian banks, paricularly public sector banks, tend not to write off loans but keep fully
provisioned loans on the books. One reason often cited is the possibilty of being questioned
in Parliament and the risk of investigation for favoritism, paricularly in the case oflarge
write-off.
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regulations on OFls income recognition and classification tend to be more lax than those for
banks. Moreover, DFIs provision less than bans - net NPAs as a share of net loans are about
twice that of banks. (Table VI.2). A large par of the NPAs reflects the legacy of poor quality
lending of the past-close to 60 percent ofNPAs in the "doubtfl" category comprise those
credits that have beeii nonperforming for over two years. (Table VI.3).
6. The reported NPA numbers are also believed to understate the true magnitude
of impaired assets. Banks are required to classify loan as substandard only once they have
been in arrears for more than six months.4 Exceptions to loan classification are also allowed
in cases of agricultural credits.5 Table VIA indicates that loan classification standards in
India are less stringent than those that have been adopted by many of its Asian neighbors and
other emerging market countries. Private sector analysts believe that NPA levels for public
sector banks are significantly higher at 20 to 25 percent of total loans rather than the reported
12Yi percent ifmore conservative classification standards are adopted and ever-greened loans
are identified as impaired assets.
7. Provisioning coverage for NPAs in PSBs, at less than 50 percent, is relatively
low. Tn contrast, foreign banks in India on average provision at a rate of about 75 percent.6
The 10 percent provisioning requirement for ..substandard" assets may not be suffciently
conservative, given that these assets could be nonperforming for up to one and half years.
The current provisioning stadard for doubtful loans (the majority of which have been non-
performing for over two years) recognizes that the value of collateral may not be fully
realized and imposes a haircut of20 to 50 percent on the market value of collateral in this
category. Given that enforcement of creditor claims is extremely diffcult under the
4 The regulation has recently been changed and banks wil be required to classify loans
overdue 90 days as substandard, effective from March 2004.
5 Agricultural credits are treated as NP As only when they are past due afer two agricultural
seasons.
6 This probably understates foreign banks' practices. Foreign bans write offNPAs more
quickly. Had they kept these assets on the books as domestic banks do, the rate of cumulative
provision relative to gross NP As would be higher. An alternative method for examining this
issue is to consider the present value of nonperforming assets, taking into account the fact
that court judgments against defaulters tae ten years or more. If only 50 percent of the face
value of the NP As is recovered in 10 years, and assuming a discount rate of lO percent, the
loss would be 80 percent on a present value basis.
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Table Vl.l. Loan Quality of Commercial Banks, 1997-20011
(In percent)
Gross NPAs/ NetNPAsl Net NPAsI
Gross Loans Net Loans Equitl
1997 2001 1997 2001 2001
Public sector banks 17.8 12.4 9.2 6.7 80.9
Old private banks 10.7 11. 6.6 7.3 69.1
New private banks 2.6 5.1 2.0 3.1 21.
Foreign bans 4.3 6.8 1.9 1.9 11.4
All bans 15.7 11.4 8.1 6.8 65.2
Source: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, varous years, and staff estimates.
1 Data are as of end-March of the referenced year.
2 Equity is defined as Tier I capitaL.
Table VI.2: NPAs of Development Finance Institutions
(As of end~March)
Gross NP As outstanding Net NP AslN et Loans
(In billions of rupees) (In percent)
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
IDBI 64.9 76.8 83.7 12.0 13.4 14.8
ICICI 36.2 39.6 29.8 7.8 7.6 5.2
IFCI 42.3 41.0 39.0 20.8 20.7 20.8
Total! 143.4 157.4 152.5 12.0 12.3 11.7
Source: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, varous issues.
IThe sum ofIDBI, ICICI, and IFCI.
Table VI.. CLassification ofNPAs of Public Sector Bans
(In percent of total NPAs, as of end-March) 
Sub-standard Doubtfl Loss Total
1997 28.5 59.8 11. 100
1998 31.7 56.5 11.8 iao
1999 30.8 56.6 12.6 100
2000 30.7 57.1 12.1 100
2001 26.6 61. 12.1 100
Source: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, varous issues.
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Table VIA. Past-Due Criteria in Selected Loan Classification Systems, 20001¡
(In months)
Country Special Mention Substandard Doubtfl Loss
Argentina Up to 3 3-6 6-12 Over 12
Chile (Consumer) Uptol 2 4 5
Czech Republic Up to 3 3 6 12
India 0.3. Over 6 Over 18 0.3.
Indonesia Up to 3 epto 6 Upto9 Over 9
Korea 2!
Secured portion Up to 3 3 n.a. o.a.
Unsecured portion n.a. 3 3
Malaysia n.a. 3-6 6-9 Over 9 
Mexico (credit 2 3-6 Over 7 
card)
Philippines Up t03 Over 3 Over 63/ Over 6 4;
Poland Up to 1 i or qualitative 3 6; borrower in
bankruptcy
Russia Up to 5 days Up to 1 J-6 Over 6
Thailand n.a. 3-6 6-12 Over 12
Source: Adapted from Coitavaria et a1. (2000).
Notcs: n.a. means "not applicable."
II Other criteria, such as repayment capacity may also apply to loan classification (as shown, e.g., in the case
of Poland). Several of the countres listed additionally use "pass" and "special mention" as categories abovc
substandard.
21 The secured poiiion can be classified as substadard. The unsecured porton may be classified either
doubtful or loss depending the possibility of collection.
31 A past due unsecured loan can be classified as "doubtful" if it was classified as "substandard" in the
previous examnation, and the principal has not been reduced at least 20 percent diug the previous
12 months.
4/ Six months overdue for an unsecined loan, or six months for a secured loan not in the process of collection
and interest unpaid for six months, and Joans classitied as "doubtful" on which no payment has been done for
the last twelve months. Past due loans that are well secured may be classified as substandard-secured.
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current legal system, these provisioning requirements may not adequately ret1ect the true
likelihood of recovery. Table VI.5 compares the level of required provisions in India and in
other emerging market economies.
Table Vl.. Levels of Required Provisions in Selected Countries, 200011
(In percent)
Counti Pass 2' Special Substandad Doubtful Loss
Mention3!
Argentina 1 5 25 50 100
Chile 0 1 20 60 90
Czech Republic 2 5 20 50 100
India 0.25 n.a. 10 20-100 100
Indonesia 1 5 15 50 100
Korea4/ 0.5 2 20 50 100
Malaysia 51 6i 1. o.a. 20 50 100
Mexico 0.5 10 45 65-85 100
Philippines 6/ 2 5 25 50 100
Poland a 5 20 50 100
Russia 1 n.a. 20 50 100
Thailand 1 2 20 50 100
Source: Adapted from Cortavarra et al. (2000).
1/ For commercial loans, G-10 countres do not have such general gudelines. Banks are
expected to develop suitable and appropriate levels of provisionig based on loss experience and
accounting practices.
2/ Considered general provision in Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Thailand.
3/ Considered general provision in Korea and Thailand.
4/ That portion of a loan classified doubtfu or loss that is fuly secured wil normally be
classified substandard to the extent of the market value of collateral.
5/ Computed against total outstanding loans, includig interest, and net of interest in suspense
and specific provisions.
6/ Provision computed agaist uncollateralized porton, in case of doubtful and loss.
8. The distribution of NPAs among banks and DFIs is uneven. The ratio of net NPAs
to net advances ranged from highs of20.8 percent in IFCI and 18.3 percent in Dena Ban to
a low of2 percent in the Corporation Bank, as of end-March 2001. Even though the ratio of
net NPAs to net advances in the State Bank of India (SBI), the largest bank, was relatively
low at 6 percent, the gross NPAs on the books of the SBI were 23 percent of the total NPAs
of the public sector banks and DFIs,7 owing to its large market share. Including its
subsidiaries, the SBI group made up 30 percent of total NPAs. The other large holders of
7 Including only IDBI, ieiCI, and IFei.
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NPAs were lOBI (12 percent), Bank of Baroda (5.7 percent), IFCI (5.6 percent), and Punjab
National Bank (5 percent). Thus the top five holders of the NPAs made up 51 percent of the
total NPAs in the system. In comparison, the NPAs ofthe three "weak banks," namely the
Indian Bank, DCa Ban, and the United Ban, were only 6.6 percent of the total.
9. The size and sectoral distribution ofNPAs in PSBs is shown in Table VI.6. A
closer examination of the data indicates that about half of the NP As were of fairly small
size.8 About 45 percent ofthe NPAs in public sector banks were accounted for by priority
sector lending, which tends to be of smaller size than non-priority sector loans.9 The rest of
the NPAs were mostly loans to the medium and large industrial sector father than the service
sector. Industrial sector loans are typically collateralized with fixed assets of the borrower,
thus the value of such collateral is closely related to the overall pedormance of the borrower.
Table V1.6. Sectoral and Size Distribution ofNPAs in PSBs
(As of March 31, 2001)
Amount
(In billions of rupees) Percentage of Total
Large industries 115.0 21.0
Medium industries 86.6 15.8
Oter non-priority sectors 95.2 17.4
Agrculture 73.1 13.3
Small scale industres 102.9 18.8
Oter priorty sectors 61. 113
Public sector units 13.3 2.4
Total 547.7 100
Source: Muoappan (2002)
8 The size distribution oflending by public sector bans was as follows: credits that were
smaller than Rs. 200,000 (US$4200) in amount were about 25 percent, credits that were
between Rs. 200,000 and Rs. i 00 milion (US$2.1 milion) in amount were about 50 percent,
and credits above Rs. 100 milion in amount were about 25 percent, of an credits outstanding.
9 Under the priority sector lending requirement, domestic bans are required to lend
40 percent of net credit (on a flow basis) to priority sectors that include agriculture, small
scale industries, the export sector, and "weaker" sections of the community. As of
end-March 2001, loans to small scale industries accounted for 43 percent of all priority loans
by public sector bans and agicultural loans were 30 percent of the total.
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10. Another feature ofthe NP As in India is that the large-sized loans have often
been in the form of consortium lending, i.e., such loans involve multiple creditors.
Different creditors often have different motivations and strategies of dealing with a
delinquent borrower, and the lack of coordination among creditors has been cited as an
important reason for the failure to reach loan workout agreements.
11. The high stock of NPAs has a number of negative consequences for the Indian
economy and the banking system. To the extent that NPAs were incurred by loss-making
borrowers, they represent a misallocation of scarce capital resources, which imposes a high
opportnity cost to the Indian economy. Prom the baning system's point of view, high loan
loss provisions, which have averaged annually above 1 percent of assets, reduce net profits
and tend to put pressure on the lending rates. High real lending rates discourage new and
credit-worthy borrowers from seeking loans from banks, with negative consequences for real
economic activity. Prom a macroeconomic policy point of view, rigidities in lending rates
that result from the large stock ofNPAs dampen the effectiveness of monetary policy. In
addition, to the extent that the public sector banks have to be recapitalized by the government
because of the credit losses, the NPAs represent a source of quasi-fiscal liabilities.
C. Current Avenues for Resolving NP As
12. Recovery of NPAs through either negotiated settlement or through fiing suits
with the court system has been hampered by the "public character" of PSBs. Even
though negotiated settlement ofNPAs has been found less costly and faster than legal
remedies and have been quite successful with small borrowers, it has not been used for the
resolution of larger NP As.1G Settlement of such loans by PSBs has been hampered by fears of
prosecution by the Central Bureau ofInvestigation (CBI) and Central Vigilance Commission
(CVC), an anti-corrption watch dog set up by the government. The CBI and the CVC can
question settlements that result in book losses to a public sector bank, since they involve a
reduction in the capital share of the government. This threat naturally dampens the
enthusiasm by the managers of the PSBs for settlement, especially since the management
receives no clear benefit from resolving the situation by settlement.
13. Judicial and legal weaknesses are also a major factor in India's high NPAs.
Court judgments against defaulters take ten years or more and even then may not be
enforced. Roughly 1.4 milion court cases are pending. In addition, suits for debt recovery are
10 hi July 2000, the RBI issued guidelines for a one-time compromise settlement scheme that
allowed bans to provide concessions in accrued interest in order to facilitate repayment of
NPAs of smaller sizes (up to Rs. 50 million). The scheme appeared to be successful, with the
amount of recovery reaching Rs. 22 billon as of July 30, 2001. In August 2001, the RBI also
issued guidelines for a non-statutory mechanism for Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR),
following the principles otthe London Approach. However, this mechanism has not been
actively used up to now.
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barred once a company is designated as a sick unit, under the purview of the Board for
Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR, established under the Sick Industrial
Companies Act of 1985). Though the BIFR procedure was designed with the idea of quick
bankrptcy proceeding (modeled on the U.S. Chapter 1 I), in practice it usually takes four
years or more even to decide whether a finn is viable. These delays and favorable treatment
for "sick" firms, such as relief from debt service obligations and, in the past, access to low
cost credits, have led even SOUle non-sick firms to take advantage of "sick status."ii
14. Since 1993, the governm~nt has begun setting up special debt recovery tribunals
(DRTs) to bypass the courts and provide speedier resolutions, but so far this has not
had a major impact. The tribunals were given authority over credit-related cases and the
transfer of pending cases was mandatory. However, resources and skils were insuffcient.
Delaying tactics were not penalized and no penalties exist for violation of sanctions. There
have been important efforts to improve the effectiveness of the tribunal system, including a
March 2000 amendment to the Debt Recovery Tribunals Act that provided for the attchment
of collateral, and the 2000/01 budget provided for a substantial increase in the number of
tribunals and their staff Nevertheless, now even with 29 tribunals and 5 appeals tribunals,
they are clearly insuftcient. As of September 200 l, the DRTs had disposed of only
18,703 cases (less than 0.2 percent ofthe pending court cases) and had recovered only
Rs. 35 bilion.
D. Lessons from International Experiences
15. AMCs have been used extensively as an instrument of bank restructuring in
countries that have experienced banking problems in the past two decades. Their roles
have also become prominent in the resolution of the Asian financial crisis ofthe late 1990s.
However, the performance of the AMCs in achieving their stated objectives has been
11 As at the end of March 2000, the outstanding ban credit to the sick/weak industrial units
amounted to Rs. 237 bilion, close to 40 percent of total NPAs of the baning system
(although outstanding loans to these units are not all NPAs).
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mixed in many countries, suggesting that potentially serious pitfalls could exist in their
operations. This section summarizes the k.ey factors that contribute to the success of M1Cs
in achieving their objectives.12
16. Policy makers need first to decide that an AMC is indeed a necessary instrument
to have in order to resolve the non-performing loans of the banking system.
Establishment of an AMC may be useful when the size of the problem reaches systemic
proportions so that special management skills are needed. An important purpose of having
asset management companies is the managerial factor. The handling of bad loans and assets
requires other skils than are normally available in a bank. Real estate specialists, liquidation
experts, and people with insights into various industrial sectors may be needed. In addition,
managing large amounts of bad assets would interfere with the daily running of the bank. Ifa
separate AMC is established to handle the bad assets, both the good ban and the AMC could
be given independent and transparent profit goals. That would provide clearer incentives for
managers and staff. Moreover, to the extent that the workout of non-performing assets is
hampered by a lack of coordination among different creditors, a AMC could facilitate the
resolution of such loans with multiple creditors.
17. Experience has shown that AMCs with clearly defined, focused, and consistent
goals are more likely to be effective. Different countries have taken different approaches to
defining the goals for their AMCs. In some countries the AMCs functioned mainly as rapid
disposal vehicles, where the goal was to dispose of the asset as quickly as possible so as to
avoid further deterioration in value and to minimize the carrying cost of the government. In
other countries the government set.up vehicles whose focus was on restructuring. In some
cases, the emphasis was on restrcturing the nonperforming loans so as to make them
marketable. In others, the goal was to achieve broader corporate restructuring of the
borrowers and the government owned ban. Regardless of the focuses of different AMCs,
their operations should be guided ultimately by the objective of profit maximization or loss
minimization, taking into full account market conditions as well as the funding cost to the
AMC.
18. There are no clear-cut rules as to whether a single AMC monopoly (the
centralized approach) is preferable to a number of competing AMCs (the decentralized
approach). There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each approach. A very
large AMC may obtain economies of scale but could also become unwieldy, which might
hamper the ability to react swiftly, such as in sales transactions. In general, the choice of a
paricular organizational structue for AMCs depend on a number of factors, including types
of assets, magnitude of the problem, depth of markets, and characteristics of debtors. For
instance, when the tyes of impaired assets in different bans differ substantially, there may
be some rationale to group assets by types and to transfer them to AMes specializing in the
management of a particular type or types of assets. When there is lack of depth in markets for
12 Table VI. 7 summarizes key features of AMCs in Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.
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certain assets, there may be stronger rationale for a centralized approach in the disposal of
such assets.
19. AMCs must have adequate legal powers. The legal basis of the AMC should
provide for clean transfers of titles (and the associated priority) in all asset transactions ofthe
AMC. Similarly, legal obstacles for the transfer of assets, such as the requirement that the
permission of the debtors be obtained before the transfer of loans can be effected, should be
removed. The legal basis should ensure that the AMC "stands in the shoes" of the former
bank at least in the eyes of the law. In addition, asset disposal by public AMCs could be
retarded by perceived potential legal liabilities accming to the AMC management. In this
situation, legal protection for the employees of the AMCs in the execution of their
responsibilties in good faith should be considered. Furthermore, when the existing legal
system is not equipped to deal with the magnitude of the nonperforming assets, or when
endeavors to refòrm the system are excessively time.consuming, there may be a case to grant
special legal powers to AMCs, as was done, for example, in Malaysia, to facìltate asset
recovery and restmcturing.
20. To be effective, an out-of-court process for financial and corporate restructuring
needs to be backed up by credible court-supervised processes for seizure of assets,
foreclosure, liquidation, receivership, and reorganization. 
13 Without the threat of court-
imposed loss, there is not enough incentive for corporate debtors to cooperate with voluntar
efforts and agree to asset sales, equity dilution, and diminution of management control that
may be par of a fair restructuring deal. While some debtors might voluntarily cooperate,
more often the success of out-of-court efforts ultmately depends on the abì1ty of creditors to
impose loss on debtors through the seizure of assets, foreclosure, or liquidation. During the
Asian crisis, the threat by legal regimes offorec1osure and banuptcy was relatively robust
in Korea and Malaysia. In Thailand and Indonesia, however, the threat remains rather
attenuated, even after efforts at reform. Repeated demonstration of an ability by Korea's
courts and creditors to seize ownership and control of a debtor corporation encouraged others
to cooperate with voluntar workout effort.
21. Stakeholders ofthe AMC must be able to evaluate its performance. A realistic
valuation/pricing of assets based on market pricing, sound accounting norms, strong loan
classification and provisioning standards, and/or discounted present values, is crucial to the
success of AMes. Evaluating perfòrmance requires proper accounting for the assets at the
time of transfer and for cash flows over time. Unfortnately, when AMCs have carried assets
13 Box VI. 1 lists the key ingredients of an effective corporate restructuring framework that
are considered international best practices.
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Box VI.l. Suggested Best Practices for Corporate Restructuring
Bankruptcy Regime
. A prompt ability by unsecured creditors to appoint a receiver to liquidate a company for a general failure
to servce debts on time;
. A prompt ability by secm'ed creditors to seize and sell collateral;
. A couit-supenrised reorganzation frework that protects debtors from asset seizes; provides priority
for new lending; gives a debtor and its creditors an opportty to work out a mutually satisfactory
restrctug plan; allows a majority of creditors to "cram down" a reorganzation plan on a holdout
minority of creditors; and converts the case into a coru-supervised liquidation if interim milestones and
reasonable deadines are not met; .
. A legal presuniption, which can be altered in negotiation, that the equity interests of all shareholders-
including miority shareholders-are wiped out in case of corporate inolvency; and
. Substantial institutional capacity, in terms of experenced judges, receivers, and insolvency professionals.
Out-or-Court Processes
. Agreed standads among fiancial institutions for out-of-court workouts, includig appointment of a lead
creditor and steerig committee; development and sharg of inormation; priority for new lendig;
apportionment of losses among creditor classes; thresholds for creditor approval of proposed workouts;
and means for the resolution of inter-creditor differences;
. Reliance on market paricipants to strcture and negotiate out-of-cour workouts based on available
information and the paricipants' commercial interests; and
. A strong fiancial regulator able and willing to force bans to take immediate losses on corporate
restrctug and to take over bans whose risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio falls below an acceptable
leveL.
Market for Impaired Assets
. A well-developed secondar market for corporate debt, including distressed debt;
. Opportities and encouragement for banks to set up professionally managed private asset management
companes for distressed corporate debt and converted equity;
. If a public asset management company is needed, its operation should be based on best commercial and
market principles;
. No legal barers to the debt/equity conversions or the swift re-deployment of corporate shares, real estate,
and productive assets-includig though foreign investment, hostile taeover, or merger; and
. No imediate taxation of non-cash corporate reorganzations, e.g., mergers, shae swaps.
Source: Adapted from Kawai et a1. (2000).
at their old book value, they typically show low recoveries leading the public to believe that
the AMC has been a failure. Performance should be measured against either a "mark-to-
market" value or an estimated recovery value at the time oftransfer. If assets trarsfer at book
value then appropriate provisions should be established as soon as possible after transtèr, so
that the initial shortfall is clear to everyone and performance is measured against original
book value net of provisions.
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22. To shield the AMC from undue political influence, steps should be taken to
ensure its operational independence. Because AMCs handle large volumes of assets, and in
some countries may control a significant percentage of the wealth of the nation, it is
importt that they be insulated from political interference in the disposal and restrcturing
of assets. One approach is to establish the AMC as an independent entity not subject to the
whims of the legislative process. It should be governed by an independent and professional
board of directors. In addition, it should be given independence from the budget
appropriations process in the same manner as that of central banks. Rather, the AMC should
fund its operating expenses from its own cash flow.
23. There is a need for a structure of incentives that are designed to ensure effective
and effcient asset management and disposaL. A right incentive structure needs to address
both the issues of the limited life of the entity and the performance of the staff. One option is
to limit the life of the AMC at the time it is created. Another approach is to develop
incentives for the board members so that they wil counterbalance the motivations of the staíI
to prolong the life of the AMC unnecessarily. In addition, a large par of the compensation
packages for statI should be performance based. Just as an AMC's performance should be
judged based on its recoveries compared to the original estimated recovery value, a similar
approach should be used for establishing performance goals for employees and managers.
24. When public AMCs have discretion in the choice of assets to purchase or take
over, they should apply strict criteria in the selection ofthe assets. In principle, they
should only take on those assets they are likely to manage more effectively. For example,
small credits whose recovery can be undertaken more effciently by the ban branches where
the credit originated should also be left with the bans, but fixed assets such as foreclosed
properties and loans that require foreclosure or settlement with debtors are good candidates
for transfer to AMCs.
25. Innovative vehicles may be needed to deal with the financing needs of a
corporate borrower that is implementing a restructuring plan approved by its
creditors. When a NPA is purchased by the ARC, the banking relationship between the
borrower and the bank tyically ends. In principle, NPAs owed by borrowers that are
potentially viable, perhaps afer financial and operational restructuring, should stay with the
bank, although the bank's existing claims against the borrower may need to be restructured
through financial engineering techniques such as a debt/equity swap. Nevertheless, the ARC
could stil play an important role. The ARC could sponsor corporate restructuring or de-
leveraging funds, which can be set up to manage the corporate restructuring tasks on the
bans' behalf, since bans are not typically good at managing equity stakes in industrial
companies. Therefore, the relationship between the ARC and the bans is likely to be more
complicated than a straightforward one of buy and sell.
26. The transfer of assets to the AMes should be executed at fair market prices.
Several approaches to transfer pricing have been used, each with their own benefits and
limitations. A uniform price can be established, based on a fixed portion of book value. This
approach permits quick transfer without delays in negotiations with the ban but raises the
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possibility that the AMC purchases the worse assets while the bank retais the better assets.
An alterative is to set a price that can be adjusted in light of eventual proceeds. A drawback
of this approach is that it may reduce the wilingness of the sellers to par with the assets
since they wil stil maintain their exposure to the final price of the assets. Tn this situation,
some form of profit-loss sharing arrangement can help overcome this problem. In Thailand,
for example, the originating ban and the Thai Asset Management Corporation (T AMC)
would share equally the first 20 percent ofthe gains relative to the transfer price, with the
remainder accruing to the banks. In the event of a loss, the bans' losses wil be capped at
30 percent of the transfer price.
27. Speed of disposal of impaired assets should be primarily a commercial decision.
It should be guided by the goal of maximizing the value of assets by taking into account of
market conditions as well as the funding cost of the asset management companies. The AMC
typically faces conflicting pressures when it comes to the disposal of its assets. The AMC
may sen its assets immediately, reducing the concerns about warehousing of assets but
accepting fire sale prices. Alternatively, the AMC may seek to manage the assets, waiting for
a recovery ofthe economy and the opportnity to sell the assets gradually into the market.
However, managing assets creates the significant risk that asset values wil deteriorate,
paricularly if the skil mix of the AMC staff is in asset resolution rather than the long term
management of assets. While a number of alternatives have been suggested (including
competitive bidding, securitization of income streams from assets, and put-back clauses in
the sales contract), there is little experience to date on the final resolution of assets. Sweden
allowed a five-year period for the resolution of the asset and the United States allowed seven
years. Other AMes, however, continue to struggle with asset resolution.
E. Key Issues for An Effective ARC in India
28. In the 2002/2003 budget, the government announced plans to establish a pilot
ARC in India by June 2002. il parallel, the government plans to submit to Parliament a
Banking Sector Reforms Bil that wil provide an enabling legal environment for the
development of a market for impaired assets. It is envisaged that the pilot ARC wìI initially
have a small capital base and wil be incorporated as a private sector entity, to be owned
jointly by public sector banks and financial institutions, multiateral institutions, and other
private sector investors and to be run by professional managers. Other details of the proposal
are stil being worked out.
29. To be effective, the ARC should be designed to reflect the nature of the NPA
problem in India, as well as to follow international best practices. There are a number of
key considerations in the Indian context. First, tlie legal and judicial environment must be
improved for timely exercise of creditor rights. The value of impaired assets wil increase
substantially if foreclosure rights are strengthened and the bankruptcy procedures are
streamined. Second, the ARC should be managed and run on commercial principles.
Transactions between the ARC and the public sector banks and financial institutions, which
will be its major shareholders, should be on an ars-lengt basis so that transfer prices wil
be market determined. The ARC should not be used as an instrument to "window dress" the
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NP A problems of its major shareholders. Third, the authorities have to be prepared to allow
the major banks to recognize hidden credit losses and a strategy for fillng recapitalization
needs to be put in place, otherwise few transactions wíl take place.
30. An effective ARC in India must operate under a conducive legal framework. The
ARC must have suffcient legal powers to recover assets, such as the ability to attach assets
and foreclose on collateral without going through the court system. Furthermore, in order that
delinquent borrowers wil have the right incentives to cooperate in good faith with the ARC,
the Sick Industrial Companies Act must be repealed and the BIFR be abolished. In its place,
an effective insolvency regime for the corporate sector should be put in place (see Box VI. 1).
This does not imply that the ARC should not be established betòre such legal reforms are
implemented. It is nevertheless tme that the ARC wil not be effective in achieving its
objectives without such legal reforms.
31. Mixed ownership of the ARC has complex implications for a number of
operational issues. An important issue relates to whether the government should guarantee
the liabilities issued by the ARC as a source of funding. Although a government guarantee
could help the ARC have easier access to market fuding and lower its fuding cost, it has
importt implications for incentives. Without a government guarantee, bond holders must
look to the value of the assets for payment and the ARC wil be motivated to ensure that
assets are properly valued when they are transferred to the ARC. Moreover, there wil be an
ongoing incentive for revaluation and proper financial reporting. With a government
guarantee, these incentives wil, to a large extent, be dulled and the resultant moral hazard
could expose the government to higher fiscal costs. On the other hand, even without an
explicit guarantee, investors may believe that there is at least an implicit government
guarantee on the bonds issued by the ARC of mixed ownership. Thus the government wil
need to weigh the benefits and costs of guarantees and clarify its intention explicitly.
32. Ownership of the ARC by the PSBs and DFIs also raises the potential of conflct
of interest, as the PSBs and DFls wil be both its major shareholders and customers. As
shareholders, they have an interest in the financial perfoimance of the ARC. As sellers of
NP As, they have an incentive of asking for the highest price on the assets to be sold, which
would have a negative impact on the profitability of the ARC. Resolving such a conflct can
be tricky. It is thus important that the ARC should have operational independence and be
managed and staffed by professionals with properly designed incentive structures.
33. The development of a market for impaired assets depends crucially on the
wilingness of banks to recognize the hidden losses. As discussed earlier, the loan loss
provisioning cover of the NPAs does not adequately reflect the likelihood ofloss in the
Indian context. Thus transferring the NP As at market prices would imply that the sellng
banks wil have to recognize the hidden losses and take a hit on their capital. In the absence
of the wilingness and/or the ability to take such losses, NPAs wil likely not be transferred,
and few transactions would take place. The regulatory authorities should encourage the
recognition of such losses even if they negatively impact the capital adequacy levels. For the
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government, a proper analysis of the likely magnitude of losses should be done and a strategy
of recapitalization should be developed and implemented.
34. An important operational issue concerns the choice of banks from which the
ARC should buy NPAs. Previous proposals have focused on the NPAs of the "weak banks"
and the ARC was seen as an instrument to facilitate the restrcturing of such banks.
However, as discussed earlier, the NP As held by the "weak bans" are only a small par of
that of the bankg system. Thus, any attempt to reduce the NPA level of the system should
include the largest holders ofNPAs, not just the "weak bans." In addition, it appears that,
based on availab Ie data, at least half of the NP As are of fairly small size and are probably not
suitable for purchase by the ARC. The PSBs should be encouraged 011 a regular basis (rather
than on a one-off basis) to reach debt restructuring and workout solutions with such small
borrowers. Loan workouts should be seen as a conunercial exercise without political
connotations. In this regard, operational freedom that allows speedier loan workout and
write-off should be part of the larger effort to increase the commercial orientation of PSBs.
35. An effective strategy ofNPA resolution bas to involve the financial and
operational restructuring of unviable industrial borrowers. Because the representative
NPAs of larger size are industrial loans collateralized by the fixed assets of the borrowers,
they typicalty do not have much value if the viability of the borrower is in doubt. However,
corporate restructuring has been a diffcult process worldwide.. Its success depends not only
on an efficient and effective corporate insolvency regime, but also on labor laws, competition
policies, trade policies, and other structural factors. From this perspective, the resolution of
the NP As in the banking system is only a par ofthe larger effort of industrial restnicturing
and structural reforms. It is inherently diffcult and requires strong political leadership. While
setting up the ARC provides a potentially useful instrment to faciltate ban and corporate
restructuring, it would be naïve to expect that it alone wil be the panacea for the resolution
of the NPA problem of the Indian baning system.
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